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“France sustains today the best organized and most outspoken philosophical-ideo-
logical contestation of the conflation of science with technology”, according to histo-
rian of science and technology, Paul Forman, “in part because over the past three to
four decades France has been the locus of the best organized and most outspoken philo-
sophical-ideological advocacy of that conflation” (Forman, 2007, p. 6). The book un-
der review, The dizzy heights of technoscience: shaping the world atom by atom, by the French
philosopher, Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent (Professor of History of Science at
Universidade de Paris I – Sorbonne), is an important contribution to this contempo-
rary philosophical-ideological debate on recent changes of the science-technology
relationship and, consequently, on the meaning of the concept of technoscience.
In this debate, there are deep divisions between those who maintain that there
are no significant differences between science and other forms of knowledge, espe-
cially technological knowledge, and those who recognize the specificity of science as
both epistemological perspective and institutionalized practice of research (cf. Forman,
2007; Shinn & Ragouet, 2008). The book under review, however, like many other theo-
retical and empirical writings on the theme, cannot be easily fitted to one or other of
these opposing poles. Bensaude-Vincent endorses the fusion of science and technology,
ending up with a defense of the demystifying character of the concept of technoscience,
and the necessity to surpass the dualisms of modern philosophical thought; but, she
also criticizes many postmodernist ideas that often lie behind these views – she offers
a postmodern position opposed to postmodernism.
In this review, I will critically discuss the main lines of the author’s argument
concerning: (1) the demystifying character of the concept of technoscience; (2)
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technoscience as representing a radical change in the epistemological project of mod-
ern science; and (3) the primacy of technoscience in relation to social theory.
1 Is technoscience a demystifying concept?
In the first part of the book, “Archeology of a new knowledge”, Bensaude-Vincent
sketches a version of the history of science of the 20th century that is anchored in the
reconstruction of key moments of the institutional organization of science in advanced
countries. She rejects as ideological views that divide this history into two distinct
“ages”: a first “age”, in which science develops as an activity entirely “purified” from
technology and from interests and values; and a second, when science is “corrupted”
by the interests and values of war and industry and merges fully with technological de-
velopments. Different “ideal types” have been used to explicate such “ages” by various
authors, e.g., Gibbons et al. (1994), and Etzkowitz and Leydesdoff (1997). Bensaude-
Vincent (in conformity with others, such as Shinn, 2002; Godin, 2004; Callon, 2006)
interprets these “ideal types” as performative concepts that correspond, not to em-
pirically validated descriptions of reality, but to political projects for the organization
of science that “embody value systems that currently guide research policy” (p. 35).1
She also maintains that other dichotomies – “pure/applied”, “disinterested/compro-
mised” and “fundamental/applied” – serve ideological ends when they are used to ide-
alize the science of the past, imputing to it a “purified” character.
Bensuade-Vincent aims to “demystify” accounts of the history of science that
incorporate such dichotomizing idealizations by deconstructing the myths of “puri-
fied” science that completely obliterate the technological origin and dimension of sci-
entific activity (p. 49 ff.). The controversial aspect of her analysis is the claim that the
possibility of constructing a non-ideological history of science comes from the “de-
mystifying concept of technoscience”. Taking note of the constructivist origin of the
concept of technoscience, she claims that it plays an essentially revelatory function:
Technoscience is a notion that made its name in a movement of reflexive and
critical epistemology that consists in the shift of attention from the discourse to
the practices of knowledge. Technoscience appeared, then, as a weapon in the
battle against rhetoric, allowing the revelation of the realities hidden behind the
clouds formed by a range of values that systematically undervalues technology for
the benefit of science (p. 56).
1 Unqualified page references are of the book under review.
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I note at this point that the author does not offer an explicit argument for why the
concept of technoscience per se is the bearer of this “demystifying spirit”. The richness
of her reconstruction of 20th century science lies in the concrete historical cases that
she investigates when she takes the history of scientific disciplines – especially chem-
istry – as the object of her investigation. A demystifying perspective pervades her re-
construction, but it does not seem to be rooted in use of the concept of technoscience.
Perhaps, then, it is Bensuade-Vincent, as historian of science, who is herself bringing
in the demystifying perspective that she attributes to the concept of technoscience.
What I am getting at can be seen by looking at her way of pointing to the pervasive role
of technology in the history of chemistry. She presents case studies of how the specific
sciences, during the processes of their formation and legitimation, attempt to erase
their technological roots. One case involves the discursive construction of the di-
chotomy, “chimera pure” and “chimera applicata”, as it is presented by Johan Gottschalk
Wallerius in a 1751 Treatise. This dichotomy was deployed in a “purification” move,
part of the effort to legitimate chemistry on the European university scene. Neverthe-
less, according to the author, this did not in fact mean that the discipline of chemistry
was detached from industrial practices: “on the contrary, universities graduate more
chemists; more jobs are created for chemists in agriculture, industry and health. The
purity of science is an entirely ideological notion” (p. 51). Furthermore, the author
argues more generally that chemistry, from its first beginnings, provided instances of
the inseparability of science and technology, for chemistry does not build its objects
from an Archimedean point that allows us to look at nature in its purity and based on
detachment: “unlike naturalists who travel the world to practice their science outdoors,
chemists and experimentalists in general need an enclosed entirely aseptic space to
remake the nature and control their processes” (p. 51). Since chemistry fundamen-
tally needs technology to construct its objects, in practice it is not marked by the ideol-
ogy of purifying science from technology; according to Bensaude-Vincent, it is a labo-
ratory science that exemplifies the validity of the concept of technoscience.
In the light of these historical reflections of the author, I question her claim that
it is the concept of technoscience that serves to reveal the connection between science
and technology, and suggest instead that it is her historical reconstruction of concrete
institutional disputes, research practices and epistemological perspectives of, specifi-
cally, the discipline of chemistry. More explicitly, since the concept of technoscience
has built into it the fusion of science and technology, it does not serve as a good instru-
ment to get at how science and technology were related to each other in different con-
crete historical contexts. It is empirical research on the historical organization of sci-
ence and technology that can reveal the complex relations between them that change
with historical moment, social context and specific discipline. It is interesting to note
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that by projecting onto the concept of technoscience a “revealing power” that actually
belongs to empirical research on history of science and technology, Bensaude-Vin-
cent herself makes a move that the constructivist tradition has always criticized: pro-
jecting a discourse about science (the discourse of technoscience) as the concrete re-
ality of its functioning.
In this context, Bensaude-Vincent points out that the scientific researchers, who
are the main actors of technoscience, tend not to use the term “technoscience” at all.
According to her, what is referred to by “technoscience” “is neither an institutional
reality nor a political objective (...) it remains confined to the sphere of human sci-
ences” (p. 12). That means that, at least as a “native category”, the dichotomy science/
technology remains valid. For those who consider the categories of understanding and
classification of the world to be structural elements of social reality, this is a striking
observation. This is especially so, since during the 1970s the constructivist school com-
pletely changed science studies by developing a research agenda (of which ethnogra-
phy in the laboratory is the paradigmatic example) that, focusing on the concrete prac-
tices of the researchers, shows the ideological character of perspectives that do not
separate the dimensions of discourse about science from its concrete functioning. The
author’s observation, however, highlights that her analysis of science and technology,
although purportedly a constructivist analysis, fails to treat separately the dimension
of discourse about science from that of concrete scientific practices and their concrete
functioning.
1.1 Scientific and technological convergence
The tendency not to keep the two dimensions separate is also manifested, to some ex-
tent, in the way Bensaude-Vincent deals with the notion of “scientific and technologi-
cal convergence”. The “convergence” ideal postulates that the recent developments of
nano, bio, information and cognitive sciences enable an unprecedented synergy that
could unify science based on the most basic units of nature: atoms, genes, bits and
neurons. This ideal was made popular in the beginning of 2000s when the U.S. Na-
tional Science Foundation launched its famous report, “Converging technologies for
improving human performance” (see Bensaude-Vincent, 2012, for details). Since then,
policies have been introduced in many countries to encourage research in which tra-
ditional specialized disciplines are supposed to be replaced by new unified scientific
fields. Bensaude-Vincent recognizes the discursive character of the notion of conver-
gence, that it expresses a political project for science that intends – like programs that
encourage inter-, multi- and transdisciplinarity – to deconstruct scientific discipli-
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nes as spaces of relative autonomy for the production and certification of knowledge.
The objective of the convergence program is to substitute the disciplinary system by a
teleological project for science, in which the production of knowledge responds to po-
litically defined practical goals (p. 50 ff.).
However, before any conclusions can be drawn about the effects of convergence
of science and technology on society, the following questions need to be addressed.
How and to what extent has the project for scientific convergence been concretely im-
plemented? What are the precise mechanisms that make the convergence project vi-
able? Is convergence nowadays a reality that scientists have accommodated to in their
research practices, or a political project that they resist? Some evidence suggests that
convergence should be looked at mainly as a discourse or a project, and not as an al-
ready accomplished reality or inexorable tendency.
In Brazil, e.g., it appears that convergence is not yet an accomplished reality,
although there are strong pressures to make it so. Mihäil Roco (the principal author of
the US NSF Report on converging technologies) visited São Paulo in November, 2011
aiming to “motivate Brazilian researchers to work together with colleagues from other
areas in large, ambitious, scientific, economic and social high-impact projects”
(Fapesp, 2012, p. 48). But, although he has claimed that convergence is an inexorable
trend (cf. Bensuade-Vincent, 2012), in São Paulo, he seemed to have changed his mind,
for he stated: “it is not easy to convince a scientist to really take seriously what a col-
league from another area is doing. One of my tasks is to take the scientists away from
the inertia in which they live and show that they can earn a lot by working with special-
ists from other areas” (Fapesp, 2012, p. 48).
It seems that there exists a big gap between the project for scientific/technologi-
cal convergence, and the concrete practices of many researchers who continue to work
within their disciplinary traditions. The convergence project, therefore, should be
treated as a discourse – or mainly as a discourse; and the process of building or produc-
ing convergence, as well as all the other elements of what authors call “technoscience”,
should be treated as a privileged research object, and not as a stabilized reality.
2 technoscience as representing a radical change
in the epistemological project of modern science
In the the second part of her book, “A world without borders”, Bensaude-Vincent ex-
plores the thesis that technoscience represents a radical change in the epistemological
project of modern science:
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It is undeniable that technoscience changed our vision of nature and our way of
dealing with it. Even when the research objectives are cognitive and not techno-
logical (...) the questions addressed to nature have changed. Instead of “why?”,
one asks “how does it work?” (p. 117).
This thesis draws support from the analysis (in §1 above) of the transformation
of the disciplinary organization of the production and certification of scientific knowl-
edge into a model based on projects or problems (where collaboration from different
areas is indispensable) aiming to realize well-defined and politically determined ob-
jectives. This analysis is now continued and deepened, and additional elements are
provided to support the thesis. The author examines the cultural and cognitive mean-
ings of the technoscientific project insofar as it aims to increase the performance ca-
pabilities of human beings and material objects to the point of overcoming the limits
set by nature and the human condition. We confront here the problem – important to
postmodern thought – of the end of nature. Nevertheless, based on an exposition of
the modern conception of nature, Bensaude-Vincent argues that it is not reference to
the “natural” that disappears in the midst of technoscience, but the specific concept of
nature forged by modern science, the science of “Galileo, Descartes, Boyle and New-
ton”. This science, aiming to emancipate itself from political and religious powers,
conceived of nature as a reality, preceding and completely independent of any relation-
ship with culture and values, which can be observed from an external point of view that
is neutral and free from interests and values, and which is to be understood by refer-
ence to general laws and represented in universally valid theories. According to the
author, this “disenchanted” nature was thus invented by modern science at the price
of separating human subjects from nature: “the desire to access the hidden order un-
der the sensible appearances puts the subject of knowledge outside of nature” (p. 114).
Bensaude-Vincent identifies, at the core of the epistemological rupture between
modern science and contemporary technoscience, three changes that characterize the
new vision of nature: (1) operationalism, (2) eliminating the separation between man
and nature, and (3) concerning the status of individual objects and how they are
individuated. 
2.1 Operationalism 
The trend of technoscience that the author calls “operationalism” involves emphasiz-
ing the uses of the objects of knowledge for practical or instrumental ends, thus em-
phasizing control of the conditions (and the technical instruments needed for it) for
human intervention on and with these objects, rather than on understanding the laws
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and tendencies of their behavior in nature. Operationalism is, therefore, inextricably
linked to the project for domination of nature. 
As the author points out, however, the domination of nature is not new; it is at
the core of the project of modernity, not a postmodern innovation. Adorno and
Horkheimer, e.g., recognize its role in the science of the seventeenth century: “For
Bacon as for Luther, ‘knowledge that tendeth to satisfaction is but a courtesan, which is
for pleasure, and not for fruit or generation’. Its concern is ‘not satisfaction which men
can call truth’, but ‘operation’, the effective procedure” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2002,
p. 2). Likewise, Hugh Lacey cites Francis Bacon as a spokesman of the modern per-
spective of control, which maintains a direct relationship with the materialist strate-
gies that are hegemonic in modern scientific research (Lacey, 2008, p. 153 ff.). At the
same time, these authors recognize that modern science, by having direct dialogue with
the modern perspective of control, does not abandon the epistemological project of
science. Instead of an epistemological rupture occasioned by technoscience, then, we
are maybe facing a continuity: rather than “how does it work?” replacing “why?” as the
core question, we see both questions, in interaction, as central to the unfolding of
modern science.
2.2 The end of the separation between man and nature
The second aspect that Bensaude-Vincent identifies of the epistemological rupture
occasioned by technoscience is the immersion of the subjects of knowledge in their
objects. “The posture of the observer outside the world who seeks an ideal objectivity,
a vision ‘from nowhere’, is substituted by the posture of a researcher immersed in the
world to be deciphered” (p. 120). This “immersion” implies a rupture “with the domi-
nant epistemology in the twentieth century” that, while recognizing the limits of hu-
man understanding, was still deeply concerned with “the real”; but “technoscience (...)
is indifferent to external reality” (p. 121). From this perspective, the values of under-
standing and objectivity are lost as a consequence of the deconstruction of the
Archimedean point of view, where science was supposed to be free of interests and
values. Now, the paradigmatic examples are images and simulation models that func-
tion as “animated substitutes” of nature: “the images do not refer back to a ‘beyond’, to
an exterior that they represent more or less schematically, they are, instead, self-ref-
erential” (p. 121).
I suggest that the idea of an epistemological rupture occasioned by technoscience,
based on observer immersion, be treated as a hypothesis that needs further investiga-
tion. Other authors, who have investigated contemporary uses of images and
simulations in science, have concluded that they serve as vehicles for new scientific
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questions, specifically “for the exploration of the form of physical objects and for the
determination and comprehension of coercive forces that condition and limit the ex-
pression of a particular form in a physical system” (Marcovith & Shinn, 2011, p. 231).
For them, unlike Bensaude-Vincent, images are not “self-referential”; they serve to
analyze an “outside” that remains the privileged object of investigation. Moreover, it is
not clear why the immersion of the subjects of knowledge in their objects, and the con-
sequent recognition that science is the bearer of interests and values, necessarily im-
plies an abandonment of the ideal of objectivity. As shown by Lacey (2008), modern
science, largely characterized by the materialist strategies of research which abstract
from the human and ecological contexts of the objects investigated, is imbued with
social values, notably the value of control; but that does not mean the absence of proper
cognitive aims (cf. Lacey, 2008, p. 196). To recognize that the subject of knowledge is
part of the object – contextualized in nature or society – that researchers want to inves-
tigate does not imply abandoning the ideal of objectivity.
 
2.3 The status of individual objects and how objects are individuated 
The third and final change that characterizes the epistemological rupture occasioned
by technoscience concerns the status of individual objects and how they are indivi-
duated: “while modern science seeks to enter into an order governed by general laws,
in which each particular case is a species or a sample, technoscience isolates individual
entities” (p. 122). Their individuation is mediated by technology: the object is insepa-
rable from the devices that produce it; no longer is it nature that is observed on the
computer screen, but objects produced by devices. A new conception of nature emer-
ges from this development of technoscience, one that is even more dependent on the
modern conception of control. Nature becomes turned into the field of possibilities –
illustrated by the discussions of nanotechnology and synthetic biology in the book.
This implies a plastic conception of nature that is portrayed as simultaneously the source
of inspiration, of legitimation and of tools for the domination of nature: “Nature is
here invoked as that which ‘authorizes’ a technical project in a double sense: it makes
the project actually possible and it grants permission for it to be done” (p. 129). Nature
as “pure plasticity” paves the way for the emergence of a “world without limits”, where
there are “no limits to what is possible” (p. 146). Characterized in this way, techno-
science certainly seems to represent a rupture with, rather than a deepening of, the
modern project of science.
 Bensaude-Vincent goes beyond this idea of technoscientific rupture with the
modern project. According to her, this “world without limits” is also a world in which
all the most fundamental oppositions that structured modern thought – science/tech-
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nology, man/machine, natural/artificial – become obsolete. But against post-modernist
enthusiasm with this “flat world”, the French philosopher assumes a critical position
maintaining, that by abolishing all essential differentiations, technoscience ends up
also abolishing the conflicts and tensions needed for harmony of social life. Her solu-
tion, which goes beyond both the modern affirmation of fundamental dichotomies and
the post-modern evocation of the end of any differentiation, involves the idea that the
differences should be defined not by dichotomous relationships, but by a tripartite
one or what Bensaude-Vincent calls
a triangle of gold: nature, artifice and culture – none of these three terms has a
definite sense a priori, they are defined by their relationships (...) they are poles
of reference in an ongoing process that is constantly renewed. (…) Nature, arti-
fice and culture are not factual data (…) on the contrary, they are objects of per-
manent contestation” (p. 148-50). [So], (...) the figure of the triangle allows one
to shape a flat world, in the sense that no sacred or transcendental value is evoked.
It is a horizontal world where everything is relative, because the referents are
constructed by their relations that are being always reset” (p. 151).
This way of looking at things is compelling, if one accept the rupture between
science/technoscience and the dichotomy modern/postmodern that it presupposes. It
perhaps would be interesting, however, to reevaluate these dichotomies in the light of
the idea of the persistence of modernity.
3. The primacy of technoscience in relation to social theory
In the last part of the book, “Questions of governance”, Bensaude-Vincent focuses on
the problem of governing or regulating technoscience. The general idea is to demon-
strate how the imperative of control that guides the technoscientific enterprise ends
up to abolishing all limits to the human “management” of nature, including its most
elementary elements, like atoms and genes. But, the unexpected result of abolishing
all limits to human control is that it has become more and more difficult, sometimes
even impossible, for human beings to actually exercise control. This difficulty or im-
possibility, the author maintains, lies in the fact that these elementary objects of na-
ture are inherently resistant to human control: we can’t manage completely the atomic
dimension or the genetic level. In the same vein, atomic and genetic engineering pro-
duce what Bensaude-Vincent, following Bruno Latour and Donna Haraway, calls hy-
brid objects or natural machines: “abundant and emerging natural sculptures neither
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natural nor entirely artificial” (p. 145). The problem is that “all those hybrid beings
circulate as information on wireless networks, all available for capturing and ignoring
barriers such as national borders” (p. 145). So, the search for maximum control over
nature, which leads human beings to investigate the most elementary natural dimen-
sions, results in the impossibility of control and confinement.
Bensaude-Vincent makes a very interesting assessment of the various efforts that
have been made to address the social regulation of technoscience: ranging from at-
tempts within the scientific community (beginning in the 1970s) to create self-regu-
latory mechanisms, to innovative social proposals for the shared construction of knowl-
edge, including those aimed at strengthening scientific ethics (p. 163 ff.; see also
Bensaude-Vincent, 2012). But these efforts towards the social control of technoscience
have become more complicated in the light of social changes brought about by
technoscience itself, by what Bensaude-Vincent calls the “biologization of politics”:
“The biopower of the 21st century concerns ‘life itself’. It involves a new way of con-
ceiving life, as a set of mechanisms that we can control and reconstruct at will (...) it
transforms not only the sphere of politics but also that of nature” (p. 180).
This process limits the possibilities for social control of technoscience because
it impinges on the very conditions for the possibility of politics as a space for shared
decision making. At this point, the analysis enters the domain of social theory. Here,
too, the author makes an important inversion: whereas, in the traditional sociology of
science, social theory and its conception of society offer explanations of the function-
ing of science and technology, for Bensaude-Vincent it is technoscience that changes
the conditions of the functioning of society. For her, it is technoscience that “explains”
society and not the contrary. Is this inversion the work of society or of theory?
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